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Cleaned up redundant inline comments in the SCRAM implementation so the file is less noisy while preserving behavior exactly as-is (no logic changes).

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deepend
2026-02-25 01:54:34 -07:00
parent bb72f8afab
commit 1bf0140652
1 changed files with 1 additions and 14 deletions
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15
src/common/scram.c
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@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@
#define CLIENT_KEY "Client Key"
#define SERVER_KEY "Server Key"
// EVP_MD_CTX_create() and EVP_MD_CTX_destroy() were renamed in OpenSSL 1.1.0
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
#define EVP_MD_CTX_new(ctx) EVP_MD_CTX_create(ctx)
#define EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx)
@@ -46,7 +45,6 @@ scram_session
if (md == NULL)
{
// Unknown message digest
return NULL;
}
@@ -189,7 +187,6 @@ process_server_first (scram_session *session, const char *data, char **output,
client_nonce_len = strlen (session->client_nonce_b64);
// The server can append his nonce to the client's nonce
if (strlen (server_nonce_b64) < client_nonce_len ||
strncmp (server_nonce_b64, session->client_nonce_b64, client_nonce_len))
{
@@ -199,28 +196,22 @@ process_server_first (scram_session *session, const char *data, char **output,
g_base64_decode_inplace ((gchar *) salt, &salt_len);
// SaltedPassword := Hi(Normalize(password), salt, i)
session->salted_password = g_malloc (session->digest_size);
PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC (session->password, strlen (session->password), (unsigned char *) salt,
salt_len, iteration_count, session->digest, session->digest_size,
session->salted_password);
// AuthMessage := client-first-message-bare + "," +
// server-first-message + "," +
// client-final-message-without-proof
client_final_message_without_proof = g_strdup_printf ("c=biws,r=%s", server_nonce_b64);
session->auth_message = g_strdup_printf ("%s,%s,%s", session->client_first_message_bare,
data, client_final_message_without_proof);
// ClientKey := HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Client Key")
client_key = g_malloc0 (session->digest_size);
HMAC (session->digest, session->salted_password, session->digest_size,
(unsigned char *) CLIENT_KEY, strlen (CLIENT_KEY), client_key, &client_key_len);
// StoredKey := H(ClientKey)
if (!create_SHA (session, client_key, session->digest_size, stored_key, &stored_key_len))
{
g_free (client_final_message_without_proof);
@@ -230,12 +221,10 @@ process_server_first (scram_session *session, const char *data, char **output,
return SCRAM_ERROR;
}
// ClientSignature := HMAC(StoredKey, AuthMessage)
client_signature = g_malloc0 (session->digest_size);
HMAC (session->digest, stored_key, stored_key_len, (unsigned char *) session->auth_message,
strlen ((char *) session->auth_message), client_signature, NULL);
// ClientProof := ClientKey XOR ClientSignature
client_proof = g_malloc0 (client_key_len);
for (i = 0; i < client_key_len; i++)
@@ -276,12 +265,10 @@ process_server_final (scram_session *session, const char *data)
verifier = g_strdup (data + 2);
g_base64_decode_inplace (verifier, &verifier_len);
// ServerKey := HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Server Key")
server_key = g_malloc0 (session->digest_size);
HMAC (session->digest, session->salted_password, session->digest_size,
(unsigned char *) SERVER_KEY, strlen (SERVER_KEY), server_key, &server_key_len);
// ServerSignature := HMAC(ServerKey, AuthMessage)
server_signature = g_malloc0 (session->digest_size);
HMAC (session->digest, server_key, session->digest_size,
(unsigned char *) session->auth_message, strlen ((char *) session->auth_message),
@@ -330,4 +317,4 @@ scram_process (scram_session *session, const char *input, char **output, size_t
return status;
}
#endif
#endif